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Abstract 
In the literature on the effects of economic globalisation, the compensation hypothesis 
predicts a positive relationship between trade openness and the size of the public sector, as 
governments perform a risk mitigating role in the face of internationally generated risk and 
economic dislocations. Statistically, support for the compensation hypothesis should entail a 
positive causality running from trade-openness to government size.  We use time series data 
− for 23 industrialised OECD countries over the 1948-1998 period − to test this hypothesis 
within the framework proposed by Sims and Granger.  Our findings fail to provide 
overwhelming support for it.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years economists and political scientists have increasingly focused their attention on 
the relationship between a country’s government size in general, and its  welfare state 
provision in particular, and its degree of international economic openness.   
One of the dominant views that emerges from this literature − particularly amongst 
economists, see for instance Alesina and Perotti (1997) − is the so called efficiency hypothesis 
which suggests that economic globalisation inevitably strengthens the need to roll back 
government programmes, since: (i) public expenditure and the taxation necessary to finance it 
damage the international ‘competitiveness’ of national firms and industries, and (ii) the threat 
of international relocation of increasingly mobile capital, firms and jobs, undermines the 
revenue raising ability of governments. 
This conventional wisdoms is however somewhat at odds with the concomitant 
occurrence of two major trends that have characterised the post World War II period, namely: 
(1) the process of international economic integration that has resulted in rapid and 
progressive increases in cross border flows of goods, services, capital and technology; and (2) 
the expansion of government sectors both in industrialised and in developing countries and, 
particularly in the former, the growing role of the state as provider of social insurance.  
In his seminal contribution, Rodrik (1997a, 1998) uses cross-country data to 
investigate the nature of the relationship between ‘trade-openness’ and ‘government size’ − 
measured, respectively, by (Imports+Exports)/GDP averaged over the period 1980-1989 and 
Government Consumption/GDP averaged over the period 1990-1992 − and finds that there is 
a strong positive causation from the former to the latter. In contrast to the view that regards 
markets and governments as substitutes, Rodrik argues that this evidence suggests that there 
may be a degree of complementary between them.  In particular, he suggests that the causal 
relationship between trade-openness and government size can be explained by what has 
become known as the ‘compensation hypothesis’.  His basic argument is that the increased 
volatility brought about by growing exposure to, and dependence on, developments in the rest 
of the world creates incentives for government to provide social insurance against 
internationally generated risk and economic dislocations1.   
The aim of this paper is to go beyond the cross-country evidence and use time series 
data for a number of countries to further examine the link between trade-openness and 
                                                 
1  Cameron (1978) was amongst the first to point to the positive relationship between openness and government 
size.  He suggested that more open economies, due to higher rates of industrial concentration, were more likely 
to develop strong labour movements exerting stronger pressure on governments to provide social transfers.  
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government size in each country.  Following Rodrik’s argument, if the compensation 
hypothesis holds then, provided that (i) openness does increase exposure to external risk and 
(ii) governments do fulfil the risk mitigating role, we ought to find a positive causal 
relationship from trade-openness to government size.  In other words when, for each country 
in the sample, we observe that both openness to international trade and share of government 
in the economy have systematically increased over time, the compensation hypothesis implies 
that we should also find that the former has caused the latter and not vice versa.  
There are three main advantages in testing the direction of causality by using time 
series data for a number of individual countries.  First, data are more homogenous and there 
is no need to control for country specific factors which account for inter-country 
heterogeneities – see Rodrik (1998) for an extensive list.  As a result, the time-series causality 
tests proposed by Granger and Sims should give robust results.  Second, time series data sets 
overcome the lack of time dimension of cross-country data, and the fact that any inference 
based on the latter is specific to the underlying period. This is particularly important in this 
context because, as Garrett (2001) argues, in so far as the relationship between trade-
openness and government size is an effect of globalisation, it ought to be considered as a 
process rather than a steady state and a distinction ought to be allowed between the short-run 
and long-run relationships between these two variables.  Using cross-country data sets, 
Garrett compares the results of regressions based on levels (averaged over the 1985-1995 
period) with those based on changes (measured as the difference between 1970-1984 
averages and 1985-1995 averages).  His results confirm the importance of this distinction:  
whilst the regressions based on levels support Rodrik’s finding that more open countries have 
larger governments, those based on changes indicate that government size grew less quickly 
in those countries in which trade-openness grew faster.  This throws doubt on the robustness 
of Rodrik’s finding.  The third advantage of time series data is that it allows us to use the 
results derived from individual country data to obtain the response of government size to a 
change in degree of openness and compare this response across countries over a similar time 
period.   
We use annual data over the period 1948-1998 for 23 OECD countries and find that 
data do not fully support a unique hypothesis; only for few countries in our sample do we 
find robust evidence for the existence of a causal relationship that is consistent with the ‘risk 
compensation’ hypothesis.  These results question the universality of any single explanation 
of the link between the size of government and the extent of openness to trade in a country 
 3
and beg a careful scrutiny of both the theoretical processes underlying such a link as well as 
the appropriateness of the measurements which approximate openness and government size.   
Section 2 explains our data and methodology and reports the results of the causality 
tests. Section 3 concludes the paper.  For convenience, all tables reporting the results are 
given at the end of the paper. 
 
 
2.  DATA, METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Data are from International Finance Statistic and Government Finance Statistic (IMF 
publications) and cover (with annual frequency over the period 1948-1998) the following 23 
OECD countries, where the number in parentheses is our reference number for that country2: 
Australia (1), Austria (2), Belgium (3), Canada (4), Denmark (5), Finland (6), France (7), 
Germany (8), Greece (9), Iceland (10), Ireland (11), Italy (12), Japan (13), Luxembourg (14), 
Netherlands (15), New Zealand (16), Norway (17), Portugal (18), Spain (19), Sweden (20), 
Switzerland (21), United Kingdom (22), and United States  (23).  
We use the same measures of ‘openness’ and ‘government size’ as those in Rodrik 
(1998) and Garrett (2001), that is (Imports+Exports)/GDP and Government 
Consumption/GDP, henceforth denoted by X and Y respectively.  To have a basic idea of how 
these countries compare, in Tables 1 and 2 we plot scatter diagrams using average data as that 
used in Rodrik’s study − i.e. average Y over a number of years plotted against average X over 
the previous decade − for four decades: 1955-1964, 1965-1974, 1975-1984 and 1985-1994.  
Table 1 shows that an individual country’s position over time is not immutable, as some 
countries have changed their position from one decade to the next.  Figures in Table 2 repeat 
those in Table 1 but exclude Luxemburg (country No 14), which may be considered as an 
outlier, and add a polynomial and a linear fit which are shown by the solid and broken lines 
respectively3.  These graphs clearly indicate that the nature of the relationship between 
openness and government size across the countries in the sample has altered over the four 
decades under consideration and support Garrett’s concern regarding the importance of 
treating the effect of globalisation as a process by distinguishing between the short-run and 
long-run relationships. 
                                                 
2  These are the industrialised countries for which data for longest common period exists. 
3  Different functional forms were tried but a 3rd order polynomial was chosen on the basis of statistical 
superiority. Table A in the Appendix shows how the fits are affected when Luxemburg is not excluded. 
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One way to accommodate Garrett’s point and also test for the existence and direction 
of causality between openness and government size − X and Y − in each country is to use the 
routine bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) analysis − see, for example, Harvey (1990) and 
Enders (1995) for technical details.  The results of the analysis are reported in Table 3, where 
the name and reference number of the countries are given in the first column.  The second 
column shows the behaviour of openness and government size for each country over the 
1948-1998 period and indicates that both X and Y have been growing in most countries.  The 
rest of the columns in Table 3 give the results of VAR analysis.   
Before estimating the VAR system, we used standard statistical techniques to 
determine the trending nature of X and Y and found that in all countries both variables are I(1) 
and first difference stationary4.  This confirms that, in all the countries, both openness and 
government size have a stochastic trend which in most cases has led to a significant and 
persistent growth over the sample period.  Given this result, we then used the Johansen’s 
procedure to investigate whether these two variables are cointegrated in any of the countries 
and found that the hypothesis of existence of a cointegration between Y and X could not be 
rejected only in a small number of countries.  The result of cointegration tests are shown in 
the first line in column three of Table 3, where for those countries for which cointegration 
cannot be rejected we also give the estimated coefficient, i.e. ( )ˆ (0)t tY X Iθ− ∼  where θˆ  is 
the coefficient estimated by applying Johansen’s decomposition.  
We then proceeded to test for Granger causality as follows.  In the absence of 
cointegration, we estimated the unrestricted VAR below  
 
( )
( )
1
1
,
,
q
t i t i i t i t
i
q
t i t i i t i t
i
Y Y X U
X Y X V
∆ α ∆ β ∆
∆ γ ∆ φ ∆
− −
=
− −
=
= + +
= + +
∑
∑
 (1) 
 
 
where ∆ is the first difference operator, U and V are random disturbances, ( , , , )i i i iα β γ φ  are 
the parameters to be estimated and q is the appropriate lag-length chosen on the basis of 
various information criteria (not reported in the paper).  The rejection (non-rejection) of the 
joint hypothesis 0, 1,...,i i qβ = =  leads to concluding that X causes (does not cause) Y and 
                                                 
4  These and the subsequent test results are not reported in the paper but are available on request from the 
authors. 
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is shown in column three of Table 3 by “ through  onlyt iX Y X∆ −⇒ ” (“ X ⇒Y ”).  Also, the 
rejection (non-rejection) of the joint hypothesis 0, 1,...,i i qγ = =  leads to concluding that Y 
causes (does not cause) X and is shown in column three of Table 3 by 
“  through  onlyt iY X Y∆ −⇒ ” (“Y ⇒ X ”).   
In those cases where Y and X did cointegrate, we estimated the Error Correction 
version of the VAR, namely  
 
 
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
,
,
q
t i t i i t i y t t
i
q
t i t i i t i x t t
i
Y Y X ECT U
X Y X ECT V
∆ α ∆ β ∆ η
∆ γ ∆ φ ∆ η
− − −
=
− − −
=
= + + +
= + + +
∑
∑
 (2) 
 
 
where all notation are as in the equations in (1) and ECT denotes the residual from the 
cointegration equation whose effect on Y and X is captured by the coefficients yη  and xη  
respectively.  Clearly, in this situation a number of possibilities exist.  In the case of testing 
for causation from X to Y:  (i) X does not cause Y if yη  is insignificant and we cannot reject 
the joint hypothesis 0, 1,...,i i qβ = = ; and (ii) X causes Y if either yη  is significant, or we 
reject the joint hypothesis 0, 1,...,i i qβ = = , or both.  By the same token, when testing for 
causation from Y to X: (iii) Y does not cause X if xη  is insignificant and we cannot reject the 
joint hypothesis 0, 1,...,i i qγ = = ; and (iv) Y causes X if either xη  is significant or we reject 
the joint hypothesis 0, 1,...,i i qγ = = , or both.  The notation used in column three of Table 3 
corresponding to the above cases is as follows:  
(i)  “ X ⇒Y ”;  
(ii) either “ 1 through both  & t i tX Y X ECT∆ − −⇒ ”, or “ through  onlyt iX Y X∆ −⇒ ”, or   
“ 1 through  onlytX Y ECT −⇒ ”;  
(iii) “Y ⇒ X ”;   
(iv) either “ 1 through both  & t i tY X Y ECT∆ − −⇒ ”, or “ through  onlyt iY X Y∆ −⇒ ”, or 
“ 1 through  onlytY X ECT −⇒ ”. 
 
In addition to checking for Granger causality from X to Y and vice versa, we also 
carried out a version of Sims’ causality test by investigating the extent of correlation between 
the residuals of the ARIMA models fitted to X and Y (regressions are not reported here).  
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Denoting these residuals by x and y and the correlation coefficient by ρ, we calculated the 
correlations between lagged, current and future x and y, denoted respectively by 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ, andx y x y x yρ ρ ρ− +  in column three of Table 3.  These correlations provide a measure of 
causation from past X to current Y, instantaneous causation between X and Y, and causation 
from Y to future X (or from past Y to current X), respectively.  On the null hypothesis ρ = 0, 
the estimator ( )ˆ 0,1/a N Tρ ∼ , where T is the number of observations.  Given the sample size 
used, ρ = 0 can be safely rejected at 5% critical level if  ˆ 0.29ρ > . 
A few points are worth highlighting.  First, the results of the causality tests are far 
from supporting a universal hypothesis:  (i) only 3 out of 23 countries − Japan, Norway and 
the UK − satisfy the relationship between trade-openness and government size which is 
consistent with Rodrik’s findings;  (ii) in 6 countries − Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal and USA − the causality runs from government size to trade-openness;  (iii) of  the 5 
countries which exhibit instantaneous causality between the two variables − Belgium, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Sweden − only Greece and Portugal show a positive relationship between 
trade-openness and government size;  (iv) in 5 countries − Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Luxemburg and New Zealand − the causality runs in both directions; and finally (v) in 6 of 
the countries − France, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland − we have been 
unable to find any indication of significant interaction between trade-openness and 
government size.  
Second, regardless of the direction of causality, the distinction between the short-run 
and long-run nature of the relationship between the two variables, as emphasised by Garrett 
(2001), seems to be very relevant.  Within the time series context, given that in all of the 
countries considered both trade-openness and government size are first difference stationary, 
the existence of a long-run relationship between these variables will manifest itself through 
cointegration between their levels.  Only for five of the countries − Australia, Austria, 
Denmark, Luxembourg and N. Zealand − we could not reject the existence of a cointegration 
relationship and in all cases the coefficient estimates suggest the existence of a plausible 
positive long-run relationship between trade-openness and government.  However, in none of 
these countries does the direction of causality conform to Rodrik’s compensation hypothesis. 
As Rodrik himself points out, exposure to trade could be the result of government policy and 
it is possible that this is what our analysis is capturing.  
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Third, a clear indication of a negative causation, e.g. a negative and significant 
instantaneous causality as in Belgium, Italy and Sweden, could suggest that the effect of the 
factors underlying the efficiency hypothesis dominates those underlying the compensation 
hypothesis.  
Forth, the fact that only 5 out of 23 countries favour the existence of a long-run 
relationships strengthens Garrett’s point that the link between openness and government size 
should be seen as a dynamic process and therefore may not be best captured by static 
regressions based on cross-country data which is averaged over a number of years.  Garrett’s 
approach, however, is to replace the levels with changes but still maintain a single data point 
for each country in the sample.  Our results show that the dynamics of the relationship 
between trade-openness and government size varies considerably across countries.   In order 
to provide some indication of the magnitude and pattern of the effect of these variables on 
each other within the VAR framework, in the last two columns of Table 3 we plot the 
accumulated responses of ∆Y (or Y) and ∆X  (or X) to a unit impulse to ∆X (or X) and ∆Y (or 
Y)5.  For each country, these graphs are based on the multipliers obtained from the estimated 
coefficients of the general VAR system – which we have used to construct the test statistics 
for Granger causality, reported in column three – and hence disregard the results of the 
causality tests.  They should therefore be interpreted as if a two-way Granger causality 
between X on Y existed and are useful for a preliminary investigation, in different countries, 
of: (i) how rapidly the effects of the shocks settle; (ii) whether these effects are in the same or 
in the opposite direction; and (iii) how the magnitude of the effect of a unit shock to X on Y 
compares to that of Y on X.  On the whole, it is clear that countries differ in this respect and 
disregarding these differences and simply representing each country in the panel by one data 
point could severely bias the results. 
 
3.  CONCLUSION 
The analysis carried out in this paper fails to provide an overwhelming support for a positive 
causality from international trade openness to the size of the government sector.  An extreme 
conclusion that can be drawn from these results is a refusal of the universal validity of the 
‘compensation hypothesis’.  Alternatively, these findings could simply be taken to suggest 
that trade openness is not the main force driving the (risk-mitigating) growth in the size of 
                                                 
5  We have chosen a unit shock in order to make the results comparable both between the two variables in a 
country and across different countries for the same variable. Note that the shock affects the level when the 
variables cointegrate. 
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governments.  Despite Rodrik’s (1997b) suggestion that increasing openness in capital and 
financial markets, by constraining the revenue raising ability of governments, undermines the 
positive relationship between government size and openness, some have argued that capital 
mobility is associated with more public spending (Quinn, 1997).   Thus, the bivariate VAR 
may not be strictly suitable in that the past values of trade openness and government 
expenditure may not provide the appropriate information set on the basis of which the 
compensation hypothesis could be verified and we would need to expand the system to 
include the additional relevant variables.  Along similar lines, it could be the case that 
government consumption may not be the most relevant component of government budget 
which responds to openness.  For instance, it could be argued that – particularly for mature 
industrial economies – a more suitable measure is welfare spending.  However, time series 
data on capital mobility, FDI and components of government budget do not exist for a 
sufficiently long period for individual countries and further research ought to use the panel − 
pooled time series cross section − approach.   
As Rodrik points out, a direct test of the compensation hypothesis is to examine 
whether openness raises exposure to risk − reflected, for instance, in an increase in 
consumption volatility and uneven income distribution − which is then dampened by a larger 
government size.  Again, availability of time series data for individual countries is an obstacle 
and our parallel research on these issues relies on the panel approach.  Our preliminary results 
in this direction in fact indicate that other variables have a significant role to play and that the 
compensation hypothesis may not be the main or the sole factor underlying the growth of 
government size6.   
 
                                                 
6 One direction that is worth investigation is the suggested link between government size and the extent, depth 
and composition of industrialisation as new sectors displace the more traditional ones in the economy – see 
Iversen and Cusack (2000) and Iversen (2001) for an exposition. 
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Table 1.  Relationship between trade-openness and government size over four decades in 23 OECD countries 
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Table 2.  Relationship between trade-openness and government size over four decades in 22 OECD countries 
1965-1968,  Excluding Luxemburg (country no. 14) 
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Table 3.  Causality Analysis of the Relationship between Trade-Openness and Government Size in 23 OECD Countries 
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 1 through both  & t i tY X Y ECT∆ − −⇒  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.200; .236; .113x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − = −  
Response of Y  
to a shock to X 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
.07
.08
.09
5 10 15 20 25
Response of X  
to a shock to Y 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
5 10 15 20 25
B
elgium
 (3) 
sample: 1953-1997 
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y3 X3
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:    X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.080; .491; .214x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − =  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
0
1
2
3
4
5
5 10 15 20 25
(i) The number in parentheses after the country name in column 1 is the reference number of the country, used in Figures in Table 1.  (ii)  For each country (j), 
the figure in column 2 depicts openness − Xj =(Imports+Expots)/GDP −  and government size − Yj =Government Consumption/GDP − using independent 
scales measured on the right and the left axes, respectively.  (iii) In the third column, X⇒  Y (Y⇒  X ) denotes the existence of Granger causation from X to Y 
(Y to X) and ⇒  indicates the lack of such causation.  ECT is the error correction term.  ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ,  andx y x y x yρ ρ ρ− +  are the estimated correlation coefficients 
between the residuals of ARIMA models fitted to X and Y, denoted by x and y, and correspond to Sims’ concept of causality.  If statistically significant, these 
respectively indicate causation from past X to current Y, instantaneous causation between X and Y, or causation from past Y to current X.  The 5% critical 
value of ρ is ±0.29.  (iv) The figures in the last two columns are the accumulated response of Y and X to a one unit shock to X and Y using the underlying 
general VAR specification. They give an indication of the way a change in one of the variables affects the other variable regardless of the causality tests.  
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Table 3 continued 
C
anada (4) 
sample: 1948-1998 
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y4 X4
Cointegration:  None 
Causality: through  onlyt iX Y X∆ −⇒  
 through  onlyt iY X Y∆ −⇒  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.118; .226; .113x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += − = − = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
5 10 15 20 25
D
enm
ark
*(5) 
sample: 1950-1998 
.10
.15
.20
.25
.30
.50
.55
.60
.65
.70
.75
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y5 X5  
Cointegration:  ( )0.435 ~ (0)t tY X I−  
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 1through  onlytY X ECT −⇒  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.103; .089; .145x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += − = − = −  
Response of Y  
to a shock to X 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
.07
.08
5 10 15 20 25
 
Response of X 
to a shock to Y 
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
2.8
5 10 15 20 25
 
Finland (6) 
sample: 1950-1997 
.10
.15
.20
.25
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y6 X6  
Cointegration:  None 
Causality: X ⇒Y  
 through  onlyt iY X Y∆ −⇒  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.154; .207; .014x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += − = − =  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5 10 15 20 25
France (7) 
sample: 1950-1998 
.12
.16
.20
.24
.28
.20
.25
.30
.35
.40
.45
.50
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y7 X7
Cointegration:   None 
Causality: X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.249; .084; .109x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
.30
5 10 15 20 25
* The results for Denmark are obtained by including a dummy for period 1950-1970 to account for the difference in pre and post 1970 behaviour.  
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Table 3 continued 
G
erm
any (8) 
sample: 1950-1998 
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y8 X8
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 through  onlyt iY X Y∆ −⇒  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.185; .043; .116x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += − = = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
G
reece (9) 
sample: 1948-1998 
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y9 X9
Cointegration:  None 
Causality: X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.073; .415; .166x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
.07
.08
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
5 10 15 20 25
Iceland (10) 
sample: 1950-1998 
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
.24
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y10 X10
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ.251; .195; .016x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += − = − = −
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
-.016
-.014
-.012
-.010
-.008
-.006
-.004
-.002
.000
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
5 10 15 20 25
Ireland (11) 
sample: 1948-1997 
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y11 X11
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.265; .105; .134x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
.006
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-2.4
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
5 10 15 20 25
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Table 3 continued 
Italy (12) 
sample: 1951-1997 
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.25
.30
.35
.40
.45
.50
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y12 X12
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.014; .333; .302x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += − = − = −
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
-.032
-.028
-.024
-.020
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
5 10 15 20 25
Japan (13) 
sample: 1952-1998 
.07
.08
.09
.10
.11
.12
.16
.20
.24
.28
.32
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y13 X13
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  through  onlyt iX Y X∆ −⇒  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.410; .062; .137x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − =  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
5 10 15 20 25
L
uxem
bourg (14)  
sample: 1950-1997 
.08
.10
.12
.14
.16
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y14 X14
Cointegration:  ( )0.15 ~ (0)t tY X I−  
Causality:  1through  onlytX Y ECT −⇒  
 1 through both  & t i tY X Y ECT∆ − −⇒  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.186; .268; .051x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − = −  
Response of Y  
to a shock to X 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
5 10 15 20 25
Response of X  
to a shock to Y 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
5 10 15 20 25
N
etherlands (15) 
sample: 1950-1998 
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y15 X15
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.107; .169; .217x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += − = = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
5 10 15 20 25
 16
Table 3 continued 
N
. Z
ealand (16) 
sample: 1950-1997 
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y16 X16
Cointegration:  ( )0.27 ~ (0)t tY X I−  
Causality:  1through  onlytX Y ECT −⇒  
 1through  onlytY X ECT −⇒  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.036; .014; .057x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += − = − = −  
Response of Y  
to a shock to X 
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
5 10 15 20 25
Response of X  
to a shock to Y 
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
5 10 15 20 25
N
orw
ay (17) 
sample: 1949-1998 
.08
.12
.16
.20
.24
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y17 X17
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:   through  onlyt iX Y X∆ −⇒  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,.224; .274; .064x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
.14
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X 
to a shock to ∆Y 
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
5 10 15 20 25
Portugal (18) 
sample: 1953-1998 
.08
.12
.16
.20
.24
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y18 X18
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 through  onlyt iY X Y∆ −⇒  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,.038; .872; .131x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
.030
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-3.5
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
5 10 15 20 25
Spain (19) 
sample: 1954-1998 
.06
.08
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y19 X19  
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.058; .097; .085x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += − = − = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Table 3 continued 
Sw
eden (20) 
sample: 1950-1998 
.12
.16
.20
.24
.28
.32
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y20 X20
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.045; .339; .108x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
5 10 15 20 25
Sw
itzerland (21) 
sample: 1948-1998 
.08
.10
.12
.14
.16
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y21 X21
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:   X ⇒Y  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.123; .196; .040x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
.06
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X 
to a shock to ∆Y 
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
5 10 15 20 25
U
.K
. (22) 
sample: 1948-1998 
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
.24
.35
.40
.45
.50
.55
.60
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y22 X22
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  through  onlyt iX Y X∆ −⇒  
 Y ⇒ X  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.143; .078; .159x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − =  
Response of  ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
.14
.16
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
5 10 15 20 25
U
.S.A
. (23) 
sample: 1949-1998 
.10
.12
.14
.16
.18
.20
.22
.08
.12
.16
.20
.24
.28
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
Y23 X23
Cointegration:  None 
Causality:  X ⇒Y  
 through  onlyt iY X Y∆ −⇒  
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ.152; .232; .121x y x y x yρ ρ ρ− += = − = −  
Response of ∆Y  
to a shock to ∆X 
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
.30
5 10 15 20 25
Response of ∆X  
to a shock to ∆Y 
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
5 10 15 20 25
 
 18
APPENDIX: Table A . Relationship between trade-openness and government size over four decades in 23 OECD countries* 
1965-1968,  23 OECD Countries
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1975-1978,  23 OECD Countries
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1985-1988,  23 OECD Countries
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1995-1998,  23 OECD Countries
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Trade Openness (Average 1985-1994)
G
o
v
e
n
m
e
n
t
 
S
i
z
e
 
(
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
1
9
9
5
-
1
9
9
8
)
 
* The solid and broken lines represent 2 3ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆt t t tY a b X c X d X= + + +  and ˆˆ ˆt tY a b X= +  fits respectively. 
